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The 1983 Increase in the Federal
Cigarette Excise Tax
From 1951 through 1982, the U.S. federal excise tax on cigarettes re-
mained at $0.08 per pack. As part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982, the U.S. Congress temporarily increased the tax to
$0.16 per pack, effective January 1, 1983. The statute contained a sunset
clause that provided for resumption of the old $0.08 rate on October 1,
1985. After a half-dozen temporary extensions, Congress made the $0.16
rate permanent in 1986.
In this paper, I take a closeup look at the microeconomics of the recent
federal cigarette tax increase. My main conclusions are as follows:
During 1981-1986, the real price of a pack of cigarettes, adjusted for
general inflation, rose 36 percent.
Quantitatively, the main component of rising cigarette prices was not
the increased federal excise tax, but a rapid expansion in the whole-
sale prices charged by the major U.S. cigarette manufacturers.
The pattern of manufacturers' wholesale price increases had many of
the characteristics of an oligopoly price markup.
With the federal tax increase already scheduled, manufacturers' whole-
sale prices began to increase substantially in the fall of 1982, at least
three months before the scheduled tax rise. From August1982 through
December 1983as a result of six industry-wide price announce-
mentsthe wholesale prices of branded, nondiscount cigarettes rose
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$0.09 per pack, exclusive of the federal excise tax. There is little
evidence that such price increases were matched by cost increases.
The preannouitced, one-time federal tax increase appears to have
served as a focal point for coordinating oligopoly price increases by
sellers.
Accordingly, the full impact of the increase in the federal excise tax
may not have been the legislated $0.08 per pack risein price, but a
market-induced jump in price of about $0.16 per pack. Quite con-
trary to the conventional view of the incidence of excise taxes,the
federal excise tax may actually have had a multiplier effect upon
price.
During 1981-1986, per capita consumption of cigarettes declined
15 percent. The increase in cigarette prices was probably the main
cause of the decline.
The decline in cigarette use reflected mostly a decrease in the number
of cigarette smokers rather than in the amount smoked by continuing
users. The evidence supports thehypothesis that price increases do
not induce smokers to cut down on the number of cigarettes.Instead,
they either induce existing smokers to quit or prevent potential
smokers from starting.
Even if a rise in the price of cigarettes reduces the number of smokers,
there is insufficient evidence to determine whether the effect is re-
versible. We do not know whether quitters would resume smoking if
the price were to fall, or whether more teenagers would start.
Who cuts down on cigarettes, who quits, and who fails to start are
critical questions in assessing the quantitative effect of a cigarette tax
increase on the health of the population. It is likely that, as a resultof
the price-induced decline in cigarette consumption during 1982-
1985, about 100,000 additional persons will survive to age sixty-five.
The cigarette tax has already been studied, argued about, and re-
viewed. I hardly intend yet another review of the reviews. In particular, I
do not inquire about the general role of excise taxes in federal tax policy,
nor do I compare cigarette taxes to otherfederal excise taxes, such as
those for the airport and highway trust funds. I do not ask whether in-
creases in federal excise taxes usurp thestates' taxing roles. For the year
ending June 30, 1986, federal excise tax revenues on cigarettes were an
estimated $4.4 billion,1 constituting 13 percent of total federal excise tax
1. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Tobacco situation and outlook
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collections and 0.8 percent of total federal on-budget receipts.2 Federal
excise tax collections were about half of combined federal, state, and
local governmental excise tax revenues from cigarettes.3 For calendar
1985, total governmental excise tax collections on cigarettes comprised
about 0.4 percent of personal consumption expenditures.4 Although ex-
cise taxes make up less than 1 percent of governmental tax revenues in
the United States, the proportion exceeds 5 percent in the United King-
dom and the Federal Republic of Germany (Gray and Walter (1986)).
Moreover, I shall not consider the direct incidence of cigarette excise
taxation. Although one repeatedly hears that cigarette taxes are income
regressive, it needs to be understood that regressivity is only one dimen-
sion of fairness. In a 1980-1981 survey, expenditures on tobacco by con-
sumers in the lowest income quintile constituted 1.2 percent of their total
expenditures and 2.9 percent of their income; for the highest income
quartile, tobacco made up 0.7 percent of total expenditures and 0.5 per-
cent of income.5 From a 1978-1980 series, I have computed cigarette ex-
cise tax payments to be 0.5 percent of income for adults under age sixty-
five, but only 0.3 percent of income for the elderly (Harris (1986)).
Although an estimated 31 percent of adults are current smokers,6 one
survey of business executives found that only 14 percent of top mana-
gers now smoke cigarettes.7'8
Price and Consumption in the Modern Cigarette Industry
Figure 1 depicts the relation between consumption and price of ciga-
rettes during the twenty-three year period since the 1964 issuance of the
report of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on smoking and
health. The quantity of cigarettes is the annual consumption per person
aged eighteen and over. (It is not consumption per adult smoker, but
U.S. Department of Treasury. U.S. Treasury Bulletin. 3rd quarter, fiscal 1986. Table FFO-2.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Tobacco situation and outlook
report. Number TS-195, September 1986, Table 31.
Economic report of the president. February 1986, Table B-14.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Consumer expenditure survey:
Results from the 1980-81 interview. News Release, December 19, 1984, Table 1, repro-
duced in Toder (1986).
U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. Provisional data from the National Health In-
terview Survey: United States, January-June 1985. Advance data from vital and health sta-
tistics. Number 119, May 14, 1986.
Robert Half International, Inc., New York, 1986.
See also Chappell (1985), Shughart and Savarese (1986), Toder (1986), Harris (1982,
1986).90 HARRIS
consumption per adult.) The price is given in dollars per pack, converted
by the Consumer Price Index to constant 1986 prices.9
The price-quantity relation in Figure 1 slopes neither uniformly down-
ward like a demand curve nor uniformly upward like a supply curve.
What Figure 1 shows is the combined effects of movements in both the
supply curve and the demand curve for cigarettes. In general, one can-
9. The horizontal axis in Figure 1 represents total U.S. consumption per person aged eigh-
teen and over, as reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The vertical axis rep-
resents the real mean domestic price per pack in constant 1986 dollars. To obtain current
mean prices, I divided consumer expenditures for cigarettes (compiled from reports of
the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis) by total U.S. con-
sumption exdusive of overseas forces (as estimated by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, Economic Research Service). The 1986 data are provisional. See U.S. Department of
Agriculture. Tobacco situation and outlook reports, various issues.
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Figure 1 PRICE AND CONSUMPTION OF CIGARETTES, UNITED STATES,
1964-1966
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not sort out these separate supply and demand effects merely from the
type of data given in the figure. However, with additional information
about market conditions, one could reconstruct a meaningful story of
the separate influences of supply and demand in the modern American
cigarette market.
It is useful to divide Figure 1 into three historical phases according to
the movement of real prices: an initial period of price increases (1964-.
1971); a subsequent period of price declines (1971-1981); and a most re-
cent period of renewed price increases (1981-1986).
1964-1971The first phase was dominated by two main influences: ac-
tions by public and private organizations to publicize the health hazards
of cigarette smoking; and increases in state and local cigarette excise
taxes.
Thus, following the 1964 Surgeon General's report, the first required
health warning on cigarette advertising and packages became law in July
1966.10 In November 1967, the Federal Trade Commission issued its first
periodic report on "tar" and nicotine contents of various brands. In
March 1969, the Federal Communications Commission, applying the
Fairness Doctrine, ruled that television stations must present a signifi-
cant number of antismoking messages during prime-time viewing hours
when cigarette commercials were presented. In April 1970,11 Congress
strengthened the required health warning and banned the broadcast of
cigarette advertising starting January 2, 1971. (See Harris (1979)).
Concomitantly, during 1964-1971, the nominal price of cigarettes in-
creased by about $0.13 per pack, about half of which represented in-
creases in state and local excise taxes. Had there been no changes in state
and local taxes during that period, the real price of cigarettes would have
changed very little.
Much econometric sweat has poured forth in assigning the relative in-
fluence of health information and state taxes in the 1964-1971 phase,
particularly in the drop in consumption during 1967- 1970.12 All of these
efforts point to the same conclusion: increases in excise taxes pushed the
supply curve upward, and emerging health information pushed the de-
mand curve back.
1971-1981The second phase has been somewhat more resistant to
simple interpretation. Cigarette demand, according to some observers,
Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act (Public Law 89-92).
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act (Public Law 91-222).
See, for example, Hamilton (1974), Schneider, Klein, and Murphy (1981), Porter (1985),
Bishop and Yoo (1985), and Baltagi and Levin (1986).92 FIARRIS
rebounded after the 1971 ban on cigarette advertising and the concomi-
tant removal of antismoking messages from the prime-time viewing
hours (e.g., Hamilton (1974)). Others note that cigarette advertisingex-
penditures, though declining in real tenns for a few years after the ban,
rebounded as the manufacturers intensified their promotional events
and expenditures on nonelectronic media (U.S. Federal Trade Commis-
sion (1984)). On the supply side, the growth of state and local' excise
taxes slowed considerably: the absolute increase in nominal excise taxes
per pack during 1971-1981 was less than half of the rise for 1964-1971.
Moreover, the average cigarette was being produced at progressively
lower cost. These declines in unit cost appear to have resulted mainly
from product changes as opposed to pure improvements in technical
efficiency. Thus, from 1971 to 1981, the domestic market share of "low
tar" cigarettes increased from 4 to 56 percent (U.S. Federal Trade Com-
mission (1984)). Concomitantly, the average quantity of tobaccoper ciga-
rette fell by 16 percent.13
Accordingly, diminishing real excise taxes and absolutely declining
production costs pushed the supply curve for cigarettes back downward
during the 1970s. The demand curve probably continued to shift backas
well. The net effect was a marked decline in price with relativelyun-
changed consumption.
1981-1986During the third and most recent period, the real price of
cigarettes rebounded almost to its peak of 1970. The biggest jumpwas
from 1982 to 1983, the latter being the year of the federaltax increase.
Table 1 shows the separate components of the retail price of cigarettes
from 1978 through 1985. The total price is broken down into fourparts:
the federal cigarette excise tax; the average state and local excisetax; the
wholesale price quoted by cigarette manufacturers (exclusive ofexcise
taxes); and the remaining retail trade markup. In contrast to Figure 1, the
table shows the nominal prices in eachyear, uncorrected for general
price inflation.
To interpret the evidence in Table 1, we needsome institutional de-
tails. Cigarette manufacturers sell their products to regional distributors.
Upon transit from the manufacturers to the distributors' warehouses,
the federal excise tax is paid. (Some cigarette shipments, suchas to the
military and Indian reservations, are federal tax exempt. Thereare also
inventory or "floor stock" taxes, to which I shall return). By convention,
13. Calculated from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service,Tobacco
situation and outlook report, Number TS-175, March 1981, Table 2 and Number TS-196,
September 1986. I computed the average weight of tobaccoper cigarette to be 998mg in
1964, 840 mg in 1971, 707mg in 1981, and 621 mg per cigarette in 1986.THE 1983 INCREASE IN THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX 93
the manufacturers' prices are quoted inclusive of the federal tax. Such
prices, typically per 1,000 cigarettes, may differ by brand category (non-
filter, king size, 100 mm, etc.). When the cigarettes enter specific states
for retail sale, the state tax, as applicable, is to be paid. Regional distribu-
tors, wholesalers, and retailers (vending machine operators, supermar-
kets, etc.) attach further markups, some of which are governed by fair
trade laws in the respective states. What Table 1 shows is each of these
effects as well as their total.
Superficially, Table 1 shows that the main source of the 1982-1983
price rise was the increase in the federal excise tax. However, for the en-
tire period 1981-1985, the main source of increased prices is the manu-
facturers' wholesale price of cigarettes, and not rising excise taxes. For
example, during 1981-1985, the average retail price of cigarettes rose
from $0.67 to $1.03 per pack. Of this nominal price rise of $0.36 per pack,
$0.08 was due to the federal excise tax; $0.03 to rising state and local taxes;
$0.08 to retail trade markups; and the remaining $0.17 to manufacturers.14
Put differently, the 1981-1985 period represented a 30 percent in-
crease in the real price of a pack of cigarettes. If the federal excise tax had
not been increased during 1981-1985, but all other components of price
remained as in Table 1, then the real price of cigarettes would stifi have
increased 20 percent.
Figure 2 reinterprets the data in Table 1. In contrast to the table, the
time periods are fiscal years ending June 30. During fiscal year 1983, the
14. As a check on the accuracy of the estimated manufacturers' wholesale prices, I per-
formed the following alternative computations for a single domestic cigarette manufac-
turerLorillard, Inc.
Total cigarette revenues and total federal excise taxes paid were derived from the an-
nual reports of Loews Corporation, of which Lorillard is a subsidiary. The estimated
wholesale price per pack is computed from the formula t(R - T)/T, where R is total
cigarette revenues, T is total federal excise tax payments, and t is the federal excise tax











1978 0.813 0.218 0.22
1979 0.951 0.235 0.24
1980 1.053 0.239 0.27
1981 1.109 0.228 0.31
1982 1.173 0.213 0.36
1983 1.490 0.429 0.40
1984 1.431 0.383 0.44
1985 1.501 0.378 0.4894 HARRIS
Table 1 CHANGES IN CIGARETTE PRICES, BY COMPONENT
UNITED STATES, 1978-1985
All prices and components in current dollars per pack. State and local tax equals state and local tax
revenues divided by domestic consumption. The manufacturers' wholesale price equals the weighted
average of wholesale prices (exdusive of federal excise tax), where the weights reflect the proportionof
the year that each quoted price was in effect; the proportion of output for each brand (standard, king
size 85mm, filter 80mm, 100mm, and 120mm); and the market share of the manufacturer. Computation
of the mean wholesale prices includes generic and discount brands, whose market shares were 0.9 per-
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1978 0.55 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.12
1979 0.58 0.08 0.13 0.24 0.13
1980 0.63 0.08 0.13 0.27 0.14
1981 0.67 0.08 0.13 0.31 0.15
1982 0.75 0.08 0.13 0.37 0.17
1983 0.91 0.16 0.15 0.40 0.19
1984 0.97 0.16 0.15 0.44 0.22
1985 1.03 0.16 0.16 0.48 0.23THE 1983 INCREASE IN THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX 95
manufacturers' wholesale price increased by $0.07 per pack. By contrast,
the federal excise tax (in effect only for half of the fiscal year) increased
by about $0.04 per pack. During fiscal 1982 through fiscal 1984, increases
in manufacturers' wholesale prices constituted about half of the retail
price increase.
THE 1982 PRICE INCREASE
The key datum, it appears, is the behavior of manufacturers' wholesale
price in the second half of calendar 1982, before the federal tax increase
was to take effect.
Table 2 sets forth such information in detail. The table gives the be-
havior of manufacturers' wholesale prices for their higher-priced 100
mm brands, inclusive of federal excise taxes, from September 29, 1982,
through June 27, 1985. The table indicates the dates of announcement of
price increases; which firms announced the price increases on the first
day of the announcement period (the "leading firms(s)"); which firms
followed suit with price increases ("responding firms(s)"); and the list
prices, net of the announced price increases, for each of the six major
firms that comprise the domestic cigarette market. (The price increases
announced during December 10-17, 1982, were effective January 3, 1983.
Otherwise, all announcements were effective immediately or within a
few days.)
Prior to 1982, manufacturers had typically announced coincident
wholesale price increases twice annually. From 1975 to 1982, such prices
were essentially uniform across manufacturers. The situation changed in
1982. In February 1982 (not shown in Table 2), all manufacturers' list
prices increased uniformly by $1.00 to $21.70 per 1,000. Again, during
August-September 1982 (also not shown in Table 2), manufacturers in-
creased their list prices, but for the first time by differing amounts: Philip
Morris by $1.40 to $23.10; the other five firms by $2.00 to $23.70.15
All firms again increased prices during September 29 through Octo-
ber 2, 1982, again by differing amounts. Concurrently, manufacturers
announced "tax assistance plans" to ease the transition through the
scheduled January 1 tax increase.'6 Such plans offered limited, tempo-
As of this writing, I have not located the individual manufacturers' telegrams announc-
ing the February 1982 and AugustSeptember 1982 wholesale price increases; hence,
they do not appear in Table 2. Data on median increases in wholesale price are given in
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Tobacco situation and outlook report. Number TS-196,
September 1986, Table 5. See also Number TS-177, September 1981.
R. J. Reynolds announced its Federal Excise Tax Assistance Plan (FETAP) on October 2,
1982: "In view of the impending federal excise tax increase on cigarettes, we have de-
veloped a program to help offset the impact of the increase for direct accounts and re-
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rary bonus payments for accelerated purchases, as well as discounts to
offset federal taxes on year-end inventories.17 Moreover, several firms be-
gan to introduce generic and discounted brands.18 Still, the net effect
was to raise prices in 1982, not 1983. By the end of 1982, through five
successive increases in list prices ($0.02 per pack in February, $0.04 per
pack in August, $0.04 per pack in October, $0.03 per pack in November,
and $0.014 per pack in December), the $0.08 per-pack tax increase had
been almost twice recovered.
By June 1983, interfirm divergences in wholesale price had been virtu-
ally eliminated. In December 1984 and June 1985, Philip Morris's initial
price increase fell short of that announced by R. J. Reynolds, which the
remaining four firms followed. In both instances, Philip Morris acted
within two weeks to match the others' price.
However, as the excise tax approached sunset on October 1, 1985,
a new phase was entered. On September 13, 1985, Philip Morris an-
nounced a program to rebate taxes due on floor stocks should the federal
tax expire as scheduled and should no provision be made for a floor
stock tax refund. On September 19, American Tobacco Company offered
to rebate the differential on one week's average supply should the tax ex-
pire and "the federal government does not provide for a floor stock tax
refund to manufacturers and wholesalers...." On September 18 and
20, R. J. Reynolds offered a similar one-week refund (its Federal Excise
Tax Reduction Protection Plan) if "the federal government does not pro-
vide a tax refund to wholesalers or manufacturers...." On September
19, 1985, Lorillard announced an "inventory protection" plan to take
effect if the federal excise tax should expire as scheduled and if "the Bu-
generate funds for direct accounts to assist in offsetting the year end floor tax and
higher 1983 capital requirements. Retailers and consumers will benefit from unprece-
dented promotion programs throughout the remainder of 1982." Thereafter, the cir-
cular explained that a $2.00 increase would go into effect immediately, representing one
half of the anticipated $4.00 increase. R. J. Reynolds's next price increase, announced
December 10, 1982, was for $2.20, which, it explained, constituted $2.00 as the second
half of the $4.00 tax increase and $0.20 for "the costs associated with increased working
capital and the 3¼% discount related to the higher federal excise tax." The October 1,
1982 increase of $2.00, R. J. Reynolds stated, was "an effort to minimil e the impact to
customers of doubling the federal excise tax by recovering the higher tax in two steps."
Philip Morris USA appears to have instituted a "Floor Tax Protection Plan" in October,
1982. Brown & Williamson established an "Excise Tax Protection Plan," along with as-
sumption of the floor tax, in December 1982.
On October 6, 1982, Liggett & Myers announced a price increase on all regular brands,
but exclusive of private label and generic brands marketed by Gary Tobacco Company,
a subsidiary of Liggett. In a mailing two days later, Liggett asked wholesalers to adver-
tise Gary brands aggressively.98 HARRIS
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms does not allow a rebate of the
[federal excise taxi reduction on manufacturers' and wholesalers' in-
ventory on hand. ..." Subsequently, the Congress extended the excise
tax temporarily to November 15, 1985. And likewise, between October
31 and November 9, firms announced similar tax protection plans.
These nearly simultaneous announcements may be more salient for
what they did not say. None of the announcements mentioned the pos-
sibility of a permanent price decrease should the federal tax sunset.
They may have been intended to indicate that no such decrease was
contemplated.
COSTS AND PROFITS
Why did wholesale prices increase? There is little if any evidence of com-
parably increased costs. During the 1980s, the average quantity of to-
bacco per cigarette continued to decline. Moreover, imported tobacco
became an increasingly significant portion of all tobacco used in Ameri-
can cigarettes. Such imported tobacco, mostly Oriental leaf, cost consid-
erably less than domestic tobacco even with ocean freight and import
duties, in part because of domestic price supports and in part because
the entire Oriental leaf is usable without stemming.
To be sure, advertising and promotional expenditures of tobacco manu-
facturers rose from $1.55 billion to $2.10 billion during 1981-4984 (U,S.
Federal Trade Commission (1986)). However, this cost increase, equaling
$0.55 billion in aggregate, amounted to only $0.022 per pack. During the
same period, manufacturers' wholesale price (exclusive of the excise tax)
rose by about $0.13 per pack (Table 1).
American cigarette manufacturers are conglomerate, multinational
firms. Accordingly, data on aggregate profits by company, or even profits
by tobacco line of business (combined domestic and international) may
not be indicative of profits solely from domestic cigarette sales. More-
over, reports of accounting profits for particular lines of business can be
affected by methods of allocating corporatewide expenses. Still, the data
that are available do not support the view that manufacturers' wholesale
price increases reflected a comparable rise in the costs of operation.
Thus, for 1981 to 1985, the combined operating profits of Philip Mor-
ris, R. J. Reynolds, American Brands, and Loews Corporation from their
tobacco lines of business (domestic and international) rose from $2.98
billion to $4.77 bfflion (annual reports of respective companies). These
four companies held a combined domestic market share in excess of 80
percent during this period.
Similarly, from 1980 to 1985, Philip Morris USA, the domestic tobacco
subsidiary of Phifip Morris Companies, Inc. and the largest domesticTHE 1983 INCREASE IN THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX 99
manufacturer, achieved the following unit sales and operating income:'9
Unit Sales Operating Operating
(billions of income income per
packs) ($ billion) pack ($)
Thus, for Philip Morris USA during 1980-1985, operating income in-
creased by $0.11 per pack. During the same period, manufacturers'
wholesale prices (including discounts and generic cigarettes, but exclud-
ing excise taxes) rose by an estimated $0.21 per pack (Table 1). These data
suggest that about one half of the manufacturers' price increase during
1980-1985 can be accounted for by increased unit costs.
The evidence thus indicates that during 1981-1985, American ciga-
rette manufacturers raised wholesale pricesexclusive of excise tax pay-
mentsby $0.17 per pack. Such a price increase was coincident with a
one-time increase of $0.08 per pack in the federal excise tax, announced
in 1982 and effective beginning in 1983. A key question is whether the
preannounced federal tax increase served, at least in part, as a means to
effectuate the rise in wholesale price.
EXCISE TAXES AND OLIGOPOLY BEHAVIOR
The cigarette industry has been repeatedly cited as an example of an im-
perfectly competitive industry. In the famous Tobacco Case of 1946, the
major cigarette manufacturers were convicted of operating an illegal car-
tel in the 1930s (Nicholls (1949)). Although manufacturers were con-
victed, the consensus has been that company behavior was not changed
by the verdict. Today, the American cigarette market remains a six-firm
oligopoly. In 1982, the top four firms held a combined market share of 87
percent; the Herfindahl Index was 2543 (Porter (1986)).
How would the imposition of an excise tax affect the retail price of a
19. See Philip Morris Companies, Inc. 1985 Annual report. See also Moody's Investor's Ser-
vice, Moody's industrial manual, 1982, p. 3246; 1983, P. 3261; 1984, p. 3272; 1986, P. 3351.
Operating income equals operating revenues net of excise taxes, cost of sales, and de-
preciation. It does not include deductions for income taxes, interest expense, corporate
expense, and other nonoperating income and deductions.
1980 9.56 0.79 .082
1981 9.97 0.91 .091
1982 10.22 1.10 .108
1983 10.23 1.34 .131
1984 10.58 1.75 .165
1985 10.68 2.05 .192100 HARRIS
product sold in an oligopoly market? In general, there are two basic ap-
proaches to answering this question.
The first approach is to specify the rules of interaction among the sell-
ers and then to analyze the effect of the tax given such rules. Thus, we
determine the effect of a tax increase if the oligopoly operated as a cartel;
alternatively, we assess the effect of the same tax increase if the firms
showed no collusive or interdependent behavior; and finally, we assess
the same effect if the member firms displayed partial interdependence.
Each set of rules would give a different result. For example, for a com-
petitive industry with perfectly elastic supply, all of the tax would be
passed on to consumers. The logical inverse of this approach is that if we
have already observed the response of an industry to an excise tax in-
crease, then we could work backward to infer the degree of interde-
pendence among the sellers. With such an approach in mind, some
economists have studied how retail cigarette prices vary in relation to ex-
cise taxes across states (Sumner (1981), Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983), Sul-
livan (1985), Barzel (1976)).
The second approach does not take the rules of firm interaction as
given. Instead, the idea is that the imposition of the excise tax may actu-
ally change the rules. That is, the tax increase could allow firms to act
more like a cartel; alternatively, it could be the event that disrupts a col-
lusive arrangement.
Within this second approach, there are two lines of reasoning. The
first focuses on the incentives of would-be cartel members to cheat. The
idea is that the imposition of an excise tax threatens profit margins in
the same way as an increase in production costs. In turn, the profit situa-
tion in the industry affects the stability of any collusive or partially col-
lusive arrangement. Although economists have long held that shrinking
profit margins threaten such collusive arrangements, there is now some
evidence to the contrary (Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)). Smaller prof-
its, it appears, reduce the reward to recalcitrant behavior, and thus firms
stick together.
Alternatively, the tax increase serves as a "focal point" or "coordinat-
ing device." The idea is that in a world where explicit, written contracts
to fix prices are ifiegal, sellers wifi seek other bases for implicit agree-
ment. The classic example is the phases of the moon, used by one cartel
to determine whose turn it was to win in a series of supposedly sealed-
bid auctions. Member firms used such an external event to coordinate
behavior without explicitly communicating with each other.
A pending excise tax increase, which is scheduled to go into effect in a
national market at a fixed rate on a fixed date, could in principle serve as
such a coordinating device. Firms would announce a price increase inTHE 1983 INCREASE IN THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX 101
anticipation of the pending tax hike. Because the pending tax increase is
fixed and predictable, such firms would have good reason to anticipate
that othet industry members will respond likewise. An ideal but subtle
strategy would be to implement the price increases in successive incre-
ments, each time assessing whether other firms will match the price rise.
So long as prices were not already at fully collusive levels, member firms
could push prices well beyond the magnitude of the tax increase.
The tax increase would act as a cover for the price increases. That is,
during the period surrounding the tax increases, consumers may have
difficulty discerning what proportion of the ultimate retail price increase
was due to the tax. Such an effect would be enhanced if the indus-
try operated through complex lines of distribution, involving multiple
wholesalers and retailers, all of whom append their own markups to the
ultimate price.
The behavior of the American cigarette industry during the period
surrounding the federal excise tax increase is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that the tax increase served as a focal point for an oligopolistic
price increase. Prices increased in late 1982, the period prior to the effec-
tive date of the tax. Sellers justified such premature increases as smooth-
ing the transition for wholesalers and ultimate consumers. The price
increases occurred by a sequence of increments (August 1982, Septem-
ber 1982, October 1982, December 1982, etc.), in which an announce-
ment by one firm would trigger responses by others. Although there
were pr :e differences for a few months before and after January 1, 1983,
the date that the tax went into effect, such price differences were virtu-
ally eliminated by June 1983. Most of the price increases were initiated
by Philip Morris and R. J. Reynolds, the two largest firms in the indus-
try. During December 1984 and June 1985, when an initial increase an-
nounced by Philip Morris was more than matched by other firms, Philip
Morris soon brought its price in line. During the period when the excise
tax was pending expiration, firms made a sequence of announcements
that failed to suggest any possibility that after-tax prices to wholesalers
might fall. The pending sunset of the tax appears to have served as a
focal point to communicate to other firms that prices would not be cut.
MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL EXCISE TAX INCREASE
There is now an ambiguity about the impact of the federal excise tax on
prices, which wifi necessarily carry over to its impact on consumption
and, in fact, on health. The evidence indicates that an oligopoly price
increase occurred. If the oligopoly price increase would have occurred in
the absence of a federal tax hike, then the increase in the federal excise
tax may conceivably have had a negligible effect on price. That is, manu-102 HARRIS
facturers would have raised wholesale prices to the point where retail
prices are exactly as they are now. Alternatively, if the tax was a critical
focal point for coordinating an oligopoly price increase, than the increase
in the federal tax had a multiplier effect on price.
The value of this multiplier effect could not be computed precisely
from the data on hand. We would need to know how much sellers would
have increased price without the tax. We would also have to determine
what would have happened to retail markups. From the available evi-
dence, the multiplier effect could be as large as twofold. That is, an $0.08
increase in the federal excise tax actually led to about $0.16 increase in
retail price.
2. Taxes and Cigarette Consumption
During 1981-1986, as shown in Figure 1, the real price of cigarettes in-
creased by 36 percent. Concomitantly, per capita consumption declined
by 15 percent.
Was the decline in consumption simply a response to the rise in price,
or were there other superimposed trends in demand? Put differently,
does the downward-sloping portion of the price-quantity diagram in
Figure 1 (that is, from 1986 to 1981) represent a piece of the current mar-
ket demand curve?
One crude test is to compute the demand price elasticity from the pu-
tative segment of a demand curve in Figure 1 and compare it to other
estimates in the literature. From Figure 1, we obtain that every 1 percent
increase in the real price results in about a 42 percent decline in con-
sumption (that is, 15/36). Although estimates of price elasticity have var-
ied from 20 to 120 percent, the above value of 42 percent falls pretty
much in the consensus range of 40-70 percent (Toder (1986)).
The difficulty with simple computations based upon the price elas-
ticity is that other economic variables have changed since 1981. During
1981-1984, for example, per capita consumption declined 10 percent
while the real price of cigarettes increased by 27 percent. Concomitantly,
cigarette manufacturers' advertising and promotional expenditures rose
in real terms by 18 percent, and real disposable personal income rose by
10 percent. A more sophisticated test of the effect of price increases on
demand would take account of these additional factors.
Such a test is performed in Table 3. The first row shows the actual per-
centage decline in per capita consumption during 1981-1984 (that is,
from 0.525 to 0.472 packs per day per capita). The remaining rows in the
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mand curve for cigarettes would have predicted for 1984. For each model,
two predictions are given: the percentage decline during 1981-1984 if
only price had changed; and the corresponding percentage decline in
consumption, taking into account such additional factors as income and
advertising.20
With the exception of the Lewit-Coate model, the predicted overall
declines in cigarette consumption were less than the "price effect only"
20. Let C denote per capita consumption of cigarettes; P, the real price per pack; 1', real per
capita disposable income; A, real advertising and promotional expenditures of ciga-
rette manufacturers; S, the stock of "advertising capital," a time series in which past
contributions to the stock depreciate at a rate of one third per year; L, the fraction of
cigarettes consumed with FTC tar rating below 15 mg; T, average tobacco per cigarette;
C1, one-year lagged consumption per capita; POP, the total adult population eighteen
and over; and YR. the calendar year.
The prediction equations were as follows. For Schneider et al. (1981, equation (8)):
log (C) = constant - 1.218 log (P) + 0.462 log (Y) + 0.046 log(S) - 0.235L - 1.386
log(T). For Porter (1986, Table 6, eqUation (4)): log(C)constant - 0.290 log(P) - 0.130
log(Y) + 0.0909 log(S) - 0.390L - 0.319 log(T). For Baltagi and Levin (1986, Table 1,
OLS): log C = constant - 0.225 log(P) + 0.004 log (1') + 0.038 log(A) + 0.927
log (C1). For Ippolito et al. (1979, Table 1, equation (1)): log(C) = constant - 0.811
19g(P) + 0.735 log(Y) - 0.O14YR. For Bishop and Yoo (1985, Table I, 3SLS):
log(C POP) = constant - 0.454 log(P) + 0.919 log(Y) + 0.095 log(A). For Lewit and
Coate (1982, Table 2 Restricted Sample): C = 0.779 - 0.315P.
Except for the linear model of LewitCoate, the econometric analyses predicted the
logarithm of consumption. Accordingly, it is more appropriate to assess the propor-
tional change in consumption during 1981-1984, as is done in Table 3. For the Lewit--
Coate model, I adjusted the "constant" term in the model so that, at a real price of
$0.807 in 1981, the observed consumption of 0.525 packs/day per capita would be
predicted.
Table 3 ACTUAL VERSUS PREDICTED DECLINE IN PER CAPITA
CONSUMPTION, 1981-1984: SIX ECONOMETRIC MODELS
The methods of calculation are given in footnote 20.






Bishop and Yoo (1985) 10 5
Porter (1986) 7 5
Baltagi and Levin (1986) 11 10
Lewit and Coate (1982) 13 13
Ippolito et al. (1979) 18 16
Scineider et al. (1981) 25 21104 HARRIS
estimates. That is, such factors as rising incomes and advertising were
expected to counteract the demand-depressing effect of price increases.
For the three models that included more recent data (Bishop and Yoo
(1985), Porter (1986), Baltagi and Levin (1986)), I find that the "price
only" predictions show a consumption decline ranging from 7 to 11 per-
cent, whereas the overall predictions show a decline ranging from 5 to 10
percent.
I thus conclude that most of the decline during 1981-1984 could be
explained on the basis of price increases alone. However, unmeasured
trends in cigarette consumption could also be important. From the
Bishop-Yoo results, I decompose the observed 10 percent decline in con-
sumption into three counteracting effects: a 10 percent decline due to
price increases; an additional 5 percent decline due to secular trends in
consumption; and an offsetting 5 percent increase due to rising incomes
and increased cigarette advertising and promotion.
The unit for measuring demand in Figure 1 is consumption per capita,
not consumption per smoker. Accordingly, changes in per capita con-
sumption could reflect changes in either the average number smoked by
current smokers or the proportion of smokers in the adult population.
Recent econometric studies of cigarette smoking in relation to local
price levels (Lewit, Coate, and Grossman (1981), Lewit and Coate (1982))
have suggested that increases in price actually affect the proportion
of smokers more than they affect the number smoked by continuing
smokers. For adults, the demand price elasticity for the proportion of
smokers was estimated to be 26 percent out of a total price elasticity of
Table 4 CIGARETTE USE IN RELATION TO PRICE FOR SELECTED YEARS,
UNITED STATES, 1965-1985
Sources: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1984); US. National Center for Health Statis-











1965 1.03 42 28
1967 1.06 40 29
1970 1.14 37 30
1976 0.96 37 31
1978 0.92 33 33
1980 0.83 34 31
1983 1.00 32 30
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42 percent. This estimated effect was found to be particularly striking
among teenagers: the demand price elasticity for the proportion of
smokers was 120 percent out of a total price elasticity of 140 percent.
Table 4 examines the national data on the proportion of smokers. For
selected years, I have juxtaposed the price data of Figure 1 against survey-
derived estimates of the proportion of adults who currently smoke ciga-
rettes. I derived the rightmost columnthe average daily consumption
among adult current usersby dividing cigarette consumption per cap-
ita (as in Figure 1) by the proportion of current cigarette smokers given
in the table. (Numerical adjustments to take teenage smoking into ac-
count lead to only minor changes in the rightmost column that do not
alter the main conclusions.)
The patterns displayed in Table 4 show a reasonable but imperfect par-
allel to the aggregate per capita data in Figure 1. The prevalence of ciga-
rette smoking fell during the late 1960s. (The decline was mostly from
quitting smoking, though there may have been a reduction in the rate at
which teenagers started to smoke. See Harris (1979, 1980b, 1983).) Dur-
ing the 1970s, the proportion of smokers declined less consistently. More-
over, as the market share of "low tar" cigarettes increased, the average
daily smoking frequency showed a compensatory increase. During the
1980s, the prevalence of smoking declined in about the same proportion
as per capita consumption. Accordingly, if the decline in consumption
observed during the 1980s was caused mostly by price increases, then it
was indeed an effect of price on the percentage of smokers.
How could price increases affect individual smoking in an all-or-none
way? It is likely to be an interaction between prices and other influences
on cigarette use. Surveys indicate that substantial proportions of ciga-
rette smokers report recurrent unsuccessful attempts to quit smoking
sometimes five or more annuallyin the face of an acknowledged desire
to stop. Such attempts, which are typically very short-lived, are trig-
gered no doubt by a variety of stimuli. Perhaps price increases trigger
new attempts or improve the success rate of such attempts.
Given the data on cigarette prices, the price elasticity of demand for
cigarettes, and the prevalence of smoking, one could estimate an inde-
pendent quantitative effect of an $0.08-per-pack price increase (Harris
(1982), Warner (1986)). As already noted, however, there is a conceptual
question as to whether $0.08 is the correct quantity. If the change in the
federal excise tax actually induced a full $0.16-per-pack increase in the
nominal price of cigarettes, then I compute that, as a result of the federal
excise tax increase and the resultant oligopoly response, about 2 million
adults stopped smoking and 600,000 teenagers (aged 12-17) did not start.106 1-IARRIS
3. Health Consequences
What wifi be the health consequences of the price-induced decline in
smoking? Any attempt at a full response would require a separate paper.
Instead, I shall offer the following points.
Cigarette smoke is a complex mixture of chemicals consumed at di-
verse stages of life. A reduction in smoking will have different effects on
a woman of childbearing age, a young man trying to improve his exercise
tolerance, a women in her thirties who takes oral contraceptives, a man
who has worked for years with asbestos, or a man who already has poor
circulation in his legs. These effects are qualitatively and quantitatively
very different.
Moreover, responsiveness to price may vary considerably across smok-
ers. To assess the health consequences of price increases, one therefore
needs to know not merely the average price responsiveness of the smok-
ing population, but whether price sensitivity is correlated with health
effects (Harris (1980a)). We thus need to determine whether a newly
pregnant smoking woman is more or less responsive to price increases
than a smoker who, say, already has irreversible, terminal cancer.
At least for a number of chronic illnesses, the reversibility of smoking-
induced danger depends on the duration of prior cigarette use. We thus
need to know whether older persons who have smoked for several dec-
ades are more or less price sensitive than younger smokers. Further,
there is evidence that for lung cancer the carcinogenic effect of the sec-
ond pack of cigarettes per day may exceed that of the first pack (Doll and
Peto (1978)). In that case, a heavy smoker's cutting down on a consump-
tion might avert more damage than a moderate smoker's quitting. On the
other hand, there may be ifinesses for which the first cigarette of the day
is more damaging than the last one.
Even if cigarette use responds relatively quickly to price increases,
some of the health consequences of the resulting changes in smoking
could take decades to be manifest. Thus, one's excess risk of lung cancer
may not return to that of the nonsmoker for more than a decade. Abnor-
malities in the small airways of the lung, detectable in many of the young-
est initiates to smoking, may indeed be rapidly reversible. But once
chronic lung obstruction sets in, reversal of breathing impairment is
much slower. By contrast, the effects of quitting smoking during preg-
nancy may be more immediate.
Moreover, predicting the future health consequences of current
changes in smoking is hardly as easy as measuring the current health
consequences of past changes in smoking. The median age of a person
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enty years. Such an individual, roughly speaking, started to smoke in
the early 1930s, may have switched to filtertip cigarettes in the 1950s and
1960s, and may have quit smoking in the past couple of years. Epidemio-
logical and biomedical investigations have yielded substantial quantita-
tive information about the health risks of cigarettes among such past
users. In particular, such investigations have indicated that smokers of
exclusively filtertip cigarettes of the type available during the 1960s in-
curred lower risks of lung cancer (and possibly other cancers) than smok-
ers of nonifiter cigarettes. By contrast, the evidence that the 1960s filtertip
cigarettes conferred any protection against coronary heart disease (or
other adverse health consequences of smoking) remains equivocal.
Filtertip cigarettes, however, have evolved further since the 1960s
and early 1970s. Current cigarettes are diluted by porous materials and
perforations in the filters. Smokers compensate for the air dilution by
smoking each cigarette more intensively and, possibly, by blocking the
perforations. Moreover, the newest cigarettes contain additives, such as
artificial tobacco substitutes and flavoring extracts, whose identity, chem-
ical composition, and health effects are as yet unknown.
Accordingly, who cuts down on cigarettes, who quits, and who fails to
start are critical questions in. assessing the quantitative effect of a ciga-
rette tax increase on the health of the population. That an increase in
price appears to reduce the proportion of smokers is likely to figure
prominently in such an analysis.
Based upon the findings of epidemiological studies conducted during
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, I estimate that out of a cohort of 100 males
who become regular cigarette smokers in their teens, about 11 wifi not
survive to age sixty-five because of their cigarette smoking. For a compa-
rable cohort of 100 women, about 7 wifi die before age sixty-five, who
would have otherwise survived to that age. For males and females com-
bined, about 9 percent will not survive to age sixty-five because of their
smoking. If these estimates apply to current smokers, and if increased
taxes prevented 600,000 teenagers from starting to smoke, then 54,000
additional teenagers wifi reach age sixty-five. Computation of the mor-
tality consequences for regular smokers who quit smoking will depend
upon the age distribution of those who quit. Roughly speaking, even if
the effect of quitting were only one fourth that of not smoking at all, then
I obtain an additional 45,000 survivors to age sixty-five years. Altogether,
this would imply that about 100,000 additional persons will live to age
sixty-five as a result of price-induced declines in cigarette use.
Although there was indeed a period when the real price of cigarettes
fell (Figure 1), we have no clear evidence that the hypothesized effect of a
price increase is reversible. Thus, although prices fell during 1971-1981,108 HARRIS
the proportion of cigarette smokers did not rise (Table 4). It is conceiv-
able that, if real price had not fallen, the declines in the prevalence of
cigarette use might have accelerated during 1971-1981. Still, if increased
prices were sustained for a sufficiently long period, and if one effect of
such price increases were to deter teenagers from smoking, then a sub-
sequent fall in price may not induce them to start smoking. The great
fraction of persons now starting to smoke cigarettes do so while teen-
agers. Sustained, irreversible declines in cigarette use would have very
different health consequences than temporary changes due to short-
term price fluctuations.
4. Unanswered Questions
This paper has left unanswered a number of questions that merit further
research.
My conclusion that manufacturers' price increases were not matched
by cost increases is based on incomplete data. It would be appropriate to
assess more carefully manufacturers' profit margins by domestic tobacco
lines of business. It would be further desirable to ascertain whether the
gains from cigarette price increases figured in other nontobacco corpo-
rate acquisitions made by the manufacturers.
I noted that manufacturers began to introduce generic and discount
cigarettes in substantial numbers beginning in 1982. Although I at-
tempted to take account of the presence of such discount brands in my
computations of manufacturers' wholesale prices, I said nothing about
their role in corporate pricing strategy. With respect to the analysis of
variations in price sensitivity across consumers, it would be interesting
to ascertain what types of consumers demand such brands.
I mentioned that changes in the type of cigarette consumed may affect
the costs of production. I also discussed how future changes in cigarette
composition may affect the health consequences of current price changes.
However, I said little about who consumes such cigarettes. Nor did I ask
whether the introduction of "low tar" brands has affected consumers'
sensitivity to price.
I did not ask how long manufacturers' price increases might persist. If
the increase in the federal excise tax had been originally enacted as per-
manent, then I speculate that most of the price increase would have been
realized by the end of 1984. However, the fact that the tax was supposed
to sunset in October 1985 may have moved manufacturers to persist in
price increases. I examined data on wholesale prices only up to June
1986. One wonders what wifi be the pattern of manufacturers' prices
now that the tax increase has been made permanent.THE 1983 INCREASE IN THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX 109
I focused on manufacturers' price increases, but I sidestepped the fact
that wholesalers' and retailers' markups also increased. I am not sure
whether such intermediate sellers also took advantage of the confusion
surrounding the tax increase, or whether their markups are determined
by other rules, such as state fair-trade laws.
I concluded that rising prices were probably responsible for most of
the decline in cigarette consumption during the 1980s. Such a finding
does not by itself imply that public and private sector education has had
no effect. One can only conclude that the net effects of such informa-
tional efforts may be canceled by other factors, including promotional
activities of manufacturers.
If increases in cigarette prices deter teenagers from starting, then the
current period of sustained real price increases may have substantial
long-term effects on the population of cigarette smokers. It would be of
interest to know whether American cigarette manufacturers, in opting
for such price increases, considered a balancing of these potential long-
term losses against short-run profit gains. That would, of course, require
predictions about the future path of the American cigarette industry,
which I shall resist.
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